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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN D. WATSON,

:

Plaintiff and Appellee,
: BRIEF OF APPELLANT
vs .
CAMILLE K. WATSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

:
:
:
:
:

Case No. 960344-CA
Priority No. 15

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from an Order Terminating Alimony and
Requiring Sale of Marital Home of the Fourth Judicial District
Court in and for Utah County, Judge Howard H. Maetani presiding.
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (i)

(1995).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
a.

Whether the trial court committed error in finding that

Camille K. Watson, the defendant/appellant, had cohabited with
Jerry Talbot within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9)
(Supp. 1995) and the case of Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669
1985).

(Utah

The issue of whether a party has cohabited is a mixed

question of fact and law, and the appellate court is not bound by
the conclusion of the trial court, Haddow, 707 P.2d at 671,

1

citing Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 586 n.l (Utah 1982).

In

addition, an appellate court is vested with broad equitable
powers in reviewing a trial court's actions in a divorce case,
Haddow, 707 P.2d at 671, citing Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871, 872-3
(Utah 1979).
b.

Whether the trial court committed error in ordering

that plaintiff/appellee's alimony obligation be terminated
retroactively to January 1, 1995.

This is again a mixed question
supra.

of fact and law, and the applicable standard is cited

The appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal in the trial
court, preserving the trial court's findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and order for appeal.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 30-3-5(9) (Supp. 1995)
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a
former spouse terminates upon establishment by the
party paying alimony that the former spouse is
cohabiting with another person.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The case presented on appeal is a divorce action.

The

appellant, Camille Watson, was the defendant in the case below.
John Watson is the appellee and was the plaintiff below.
Decree of Divorce was entered on November 12, 1992.
2

The

The parties

had three minor children, and the parties were granted joint
legal custody, with Camille Watson being the primary custodial
parent, subject to John Watson's reasonable and liberal rights of
visitation.

Camille Watson was awarded the marital home, subject

to certain conditions subsequent or triggering events.

Those

conditions are, (a) Camille Watson remarries or cohabits with any
other person, (b) the youngest child reaches age eighteen, or
Camille Watson moves from the residence.
John Watson filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause on or
about November 27, 1995, alleging that Camille Watson had been
cohabiting with Mr. Jerry Talbot.

John Watson requested an order

terminating alimony payment and enforcing the provisions of the
Decree of Divorce regarding disposition of the marital home.

An

evidentiary hearing on John Watson's motion was held before the
Honorable Howard H. Maetani on February 1, 1996.

At the close of

evidence, the trial court took the matter under advisement.
Additionally, the Court requested counsel to submit proposed
findings of fact within fifteen days.

The trial court issued a

memorandum decision on April 8, 1996, and signed the Order,
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on May 2, 1996.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Trial Court's Summary of Evidence Presented at Trial
The trial court precedes its Findings of Fact with a section
3

entitled "Evidence Presented At Trial," which is a summary of the
testimony of testimony and other evidence presented at trial.
The section begins with the testimony of Robert N. Goode, a
private investigator hired by John Watson.

The trial court found

that Mr. Goode performed surveillance and other investigatory
work on Camille Watson's home at 1668 North 390 West Pleasant
Grove, Utah, beginning on December 17, 1994.
supported in the record at T.15

1.17;

T.18

This finding is

2. 6.

The trial court

found that Mr. Goode personally conducted surveillance on Camille
Watson's home from December 17, 1994, through early February,
1995, that a stationary video surveillance system was used from
February through April, 1995, that from April, 1995 through
October, 1995, Mr. Goode conducted random checks on Camille
Watson's house, and that a stationary video surveillance system
was again used from October to November, 1995, when Mr. Goode
ceased surveillance activities.
T.15

1.17;

T.18

1.

6.

This finding is supported by

The trial court found that Mr. Goode had

performed a "skip trace" on Jerry Talbot and that trace indicated
Mr. Talbot's principal domicile and residence was Camille
Watson's home.

This finding is not well supported by the record.

Mr. Goode did testify that in his opinion, Mr. Talbot was living
in Camille Watson's home from approximately December 1994 until
November of 1995 (T.39

11.4-11),

but evidence of a "skip trace"
4

was objected to by Camille Watson's counsel for lack of
foundation, and that objection was sustained {T.17

11.

4-19).

The trial court found that "Mr. Goode testified that he
personally witnessed Mr. Talbot spending the night with Camille
Watson in Pleasant Grove and not at any other address, including
that of Mr. Talbot's mother in West Valley City."

Mr. Goode did

testify that he observed Mr. Talbot staying the night and leave
the next morning having changed clothes (T.24).

The trial court

also found that Mr. Goode had traveled to Mr. Talbot's mother's
home in West Valley City once or twice a week during January to
March, 1995, and that he neither observed Mr. Talbot nor his car
at that residence.

This is supported at T.62

1.1

to

T.63

1.5.

The trial court also stated that Mr. Goode testified that
Mr. Talbot was present at the residence located at 1668 North 3 90
West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, which is Camille Watson's residence,
each night that he personally surveilled the residence.
supported by Mr. Goode's testimony at T.18

1.20.

This is

However, it

became clear in cross-examination that Mr. Goode was not
testifying that Mr. Talbot spent the night at Camille Watson's
home each night Mr. Goode surveilled the residence, and further
that Mr. Goode was not sure he saw Mr. Talbot at Camille Watson's
residence on each night he personally surveilled the residence.
(Beginning at T.50

1.23

to T.57

1.22,
5

generally.)

Specifically,

Mr. Goode testified upon cross-examination that it could be
correct that the video tapes he took showed no sign of Mr. Talbot
on January 5, 1995 (T.50
11.12-15),

1.23

January 25 (T.53

to T.51
11.16-18).

1.3),

January 24

{T.53

Mr. Goode's responses to

questioning about whether the videos showed Mr. Talbot present on
January 18 {T.51
(T.53

11.6-11),

11.18-25),

January 21 {T.52

and January 26 (T.53

11.19-22)

11.2-7),

January 23

were either non-

responsive or equivocal. Mr. Goode testified that he could not
dispute the fact that there was no evidence of Mr. Talbot on
February 3, 1995 (T.54

11.8-10).

Mr. Goode also testified in

cross-examination that there were no video tapes for February 3rd
to February 21(T.

54 11.11-21)

.

Mr. Goode admitted that the

tapes showed that Mr. Talbot left Camille Watson's at 8:38 p.m.
(T.54

1.24

- T.55

February 28 (T.55

1.1),
11.2-6).

and that Mr. Talbot was not there on
Mr. Goode also testified that Mr.

Talbot was not present on March 7 through 10 (T.56

11.11-20)

.

Furthermore, Mr. Goode admitted making mistakes either on the
dates of the videos, or in his notes. (T.

54 1.22.),

and to

admitted to making selective notes only on the dates that showed
Mr. Talbot at Camille Watson's residence, omitting dates where
the videotapes did not show Mr. Talbot (T.55

11.4-14).

The next reference to Mr. Goode's testimony in the trial
court's findings at R.243

is that Mr. Goode had observed Mr.
6

Talbot entering and leaving Camille Watson's residence having
changed clothes, which is supported at T.24

11.7-15,

but also

found that Mr. Goode had testified that he observed Mr. Talbot
changing clothes in Camille Watson's master bedroom on one
occasion, but this is not supported by the record.

The trial

court also found that Mr. Goode testified that he observed Mr.
Talbot present in the master bedroom with Camille Watson, and
observed Mr. Talbot follow Mrs. Watson into the master bathroom,
which is supported at T.41
At R.242

11.6-20.

^6 the trial court found that Mr. Goode observed

Mr. Talbot use a garage door opener to obtain access to Camille
Watson's residence (supported at T.20

11.6-10);

work on his car

in the garage at the residence (supported at T.20

11.22-24);

Camille Watson's car frequently (supported at T.23

use

11.19-25);

arrive and leave from the residence when Camille Watson was not
present (partially supported at T.31

1.19-T.32

1.9);

clean the

garage (supported in the record); do yard work at the home
(supported at T.41

1.25);

(supported at T.26

11.1-3;

enter the home without knocking
T.20

11.2-10);

return late at night

when all the lights in the home were off (recorded in the video
but not personally observed, T.25
the home {T.37

11.3-5);

11.19-25)

; carry groceries into

carry a duffel bag and wight belt into

the home and return to the car without the duffel bag
7

(T.37

11.10-25).

The trial court also found that Mr. Goode testified

that he observed children other than the Watson children at
Camille Watson's home every other weekend on a regular basis.
While Mr. Goode testified that "there were some dark-haired
children that would come every other weekend" (T.32

11.15-16)

there was no testimony other than that to establish the
regularity of the visits by the other children.
At R.242
testimony.

%7 the trial court further summarized Mr. Goode's
The trial court found that Mr. Goode testified he

went to Mr. Talbot's former residence in Wendover, Utah and spoke
to an apartment manager who informed Mr. Goode that Mr. Talbot
had left the address at 1668 North 390 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah
as his forwarding address.

Mr. Goode did testify that he went to

Wendover to check on Mr. Talbot's former residence (T.35
T.37

1.2),

1.11-

but the trial court also sustained an objection to

hearsay testimony from the apartment manager regarding a
forwarding address, so the trial court erred in stating that the
former manager had informed Mr. Gcode of Mr. Talbot's forwarding
address.

The trial court also found that Mr. Goode found several

pieces of mail in the trash showing that Mr. Talbot was using the
Pleasant Grove address as his mailing residence.
Goode performed around twenty trash searches (T.61

However, Mr.
1.12),

and

found only two pieces of regular mail addressed to Mr. Talbot.
8

T.27

1.15-T.28

1.4;

Plaintiff's

Exhibits

3 and

4.

Mr. Goode

testified that he also found some "junk" mail, but it was not
produced at trial and no good explanation was offered for the
failure to do so.

Also at R.242

T.60

1.16-T.61

1.4;

T.68

11.5-24.

^7 the trial court found that Mr. Goode

testified that he contacted Mr. Talbot's former employer, and was
informed that Mr. Talbot was using the Pleasant Grove address on
his W-2 form and as a forwarding address.

At T.30

11.17-22

Mr.

Goode testified about the W-2 statement, but never testified that
Mr. Talbot left Camille Watson's address as his forwarding
address with his former employer.
At R.242

*j\8 the trial court found that Mr. Goode gave his

opinion that Mr. Talbot was living in Camille Watson's home from
approximately December 1994 to November 1995.
at T.38

1.7-T.39

1.11,

the opinion testimony.

This is supported

but Camille Watson's counsel objected to
The objection was overruled on the basis

that Mr. Goode's opinion goes to the weight of the testimony.
Id.
John Watson's next witness was R. Craig Hilton, who lives
across the street from Camille Watson.

The trial court

summarized his testimony at R.241-240.

The trial court stated

that Mr. Hilton testified that he lives across the street from
Camille Watson (supported at T.73
9

11.9-20),

and that he has full

view of the Watson residence.

This latter statement is not

specifically supported by the record, since John Watson's counsel
struck his question asking if Mr. Hilton had a full view of the
T.74

Watson home and it was not responded to.

11.3-6.

The trial

court next states that Mr. Hilton testified that he met Mr.
Talbot two years ago (from the hearing date) at Camille Watson's
home (supported in the record at T.74

11.3-18)

, and that Mr.

Talbot had attended a "daddy-daughter" party with Camille
Watson's daughter when Mr. Talbot was present (supported at
1.24-T.75

1.14).

T.74

The trial court stated that he saw the Watson

residence every day (supported at T.77

1.1),

and that he observed

Mr. Talbot leaving from the residence several times between 7:00
a.m. and 8:00 a.m.

This is not supported by the record.

Hilton testified at T.80

1.16

to

T.81

1.6

Mr.

that he saw Mr. Talbot

leaving Camille Watson's house at that time once or twice in the
last couple of years.

"Once or twice" is not several, and the

distinction is important in this case.

The trial court then

correctly stated that Mr. Hilton testified that Mr. Talbot was
not at Camille Watson's house every day.

The trial court then

stated that Mr. Hilton testified that Mr. Talbot was at Camille
Watson's house several days at a time, and that he appeared to be
living there when he was staying there.
T.80

11.1-15.

This is supported at

The trial court then found that Mr. Hilton
10

testified that he had that observed Mr. Talbot parked his red
Corvette and white Pontiac Grand Am in the garage at Camille
Watson's home.
T.76

11.3-25.

This is generally but not perfectly supported at
The trial court then stated that Mr. Hilton

testified that he saw Mr. Talbot drive Camille Watson's car on
several occasions.

This is not supported by the record.

Mr.

Hilton testified he saw Mr. Talbot in Camille Watson's car while
she was driving, but not that he saw Mr. Talbot driving her car.
T. 77 11.22-24.

The trial court then found that Mr. Hilton

testified that he witnessed Mr. Talbot work on Camille Watson's
house and yard (supported at T.87
(supported at T.78
1.17)

11.5-7),

11.4-11),

go to the mailbox

and wash the cars (supported at

, often when Camille Watson was not present.

T.76

This latter

statement, that Mr. Talbot did certain things while Camille
Watson was not present, is not supported in the record.

The

trial court then stated that Mr. Hilton testified that he had
witnessed Mr. Talbot and Camille Watson riding bicycles together
(supported at T. 81 11.14-20),

and arguing in the garage

(supported at T.83

The trial court found that Mr.

11.6-18).

Hilton testified he observed Mr. Talbot playing with the Watson
children in the yard.

This is not supported in the record.

Mr.

Hilton testified that he saw the Watson children playing in the
front yard, but not that Mr. Talbot was present.
11

T.78

1.20.

The

trial court then stated that Mr. Hilton expressed his opinion
that Jerry Talbot was living at Camille Watson's home during the
period of December 1994 to November 1995.
for this in the record.

There is no support

Mr. Hilton expressed no such opinion.

Mr. Hilton only testified as follows:
THE WITNESS: I would say, from my point of view,
that when he's there I would assume he lives there.
When he's not there I don't know where he lives.
Q. (Mr. Greenwood) Okay.
lives there."

You say " . . . when he

What do you mean by ". . . when he lives

there"?
A. Well, I would say that when he is there he
parks in the garage and goes in the house and is there
for a few days.

I would assume that means he is living

there.
T.80

11.7-15.

It is clear that all Mr. Hilton was saying was

that Mr. Talbot sometimes stays at Camille Watson's residence for
a few days then leaves, to come back sometime in the future.

It

is not reasonable that the trial court could have concluded from
this that Mr. Hilton was expressing his opinion that Mr. Talbot
lived at Camille Watson's house from December 1994 to November
1995.
The trial court next summarized the testimony of Russell
12

Ware, a United States Postal Service employee, at R.240.

Mr.

Ware did not appear in person to testify, rather his testimony
was offered by affidavit, Plaintiff's

Exhibit

#6.

The affidavit

stated in general terms that Mr. Ware has delivered mail; to Mr.
Talbot at 1668 North 3 90 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah on an
occasional basis since early 1995.

No specific information as to

what was delivered and when was provided.
The next witness whose testimony the trial court summarized
is Mr. Talbot.

However, he was not the next witness after

admission of Mr. Ware's affidavit.
Ware was Shauna Farnsworth.

The next witness after Mr.

Her testimony is summarized after

that of Mr. Talbot.
The trial court's characterization of Mr. Talbot's testimony
will be deemed correct with the following exceptions.
trial court states at R.239

First, the

that Mr. Talbot testified that he

always parks his car in the garage which is accessed by a garage
door opener.
testimony.

This does not accurately characterize Mr. Talbot's
Mr. Talbot testified that he parks his Corvette in

Camille Watson's garage (T.150

1.23

to T.151

1.3),

and that when

he visits with Camille Watson at her house he sometimes has
possession of a garage door opener, but that it is "not a
permanent fixture in any of [his] vehicles."
1.5)

T.128

1.11

to

T.129

. Mr. Talbot also testified that he does not always have the
13

garage door opener with him.

Id.

Several other witnesses testified, and the trial court
characterized or summarized their testimony as well.

Some other

errors, or points in need of clarification in the trial court's
summary are as follows.

The trial court stated at R.238

that

Shauna Farnsworth testified that Mr. Talbot was present when she
and Camille Watson went out jogging in the morning.

In reality,

Shauna Farnsworth testified that while she and Camille Watson go
jogging about three to four times per week {T.99

1.22),

she has

only seen Mr. Talbot in the home about six times in a two-year
span (T.101

1.2-3).

So in the between 300 and 400 times Shauna

Farnsworth had gone over to Camille Watson's home in a two-year
span, she saw Mr. Talbot in the home about six times.
The trial court characterized Camille Watson's testimony as
stating that Mr. Talbot has been in her home when she was not
present, but neglects to mention that she also stated that her
children were at home on those occasions.

T.187

11.

18-20.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion when it made findirrp
of fact where no support was found in the record, and when it
made findings that were clearly against the great weight of the
evidence.

The trial court then committed error of law when it

misapplied the standard set forth in Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d
14

669 (Utah 1985) to the facts of the case.

The trial court's

order terminating John Watson's alimony obligation and ordering
that Camille Watson's residence be sold pursuant to the terms of
the divorce decree should be overturned.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED ERROR IN
ITS FINDINGS OF FACT
The trial court abused its discretion when it found that Mr.

Talbot and Camille Watson had shared a common residence.

The

testimony of R. Craig Hilton, a neighbor, established only that
Mr. Talbot appeared to spend up to three nights consecutively at
Camille Watson's home.

The trial court stated that it relied

heavily on Mr. Hilton's testimony {R.234)

f

but his testimony did

not establish that Mr. Talbot had spent more than half of his
nights at Camille Watson's residence.

The testimony of the

private investigator, Mr. Goode, upon which the trial court also
heavily relied, was substantially impeached on cross-examination.
The trial court's basis for believing Mr. Goode's testimony over
that of other witnesses, such as Shauna Farnsworth, a friend of
Camille Watson who had frequent personal contact with Camille at
her residence, was that he was an "uninterested party."

R.234.

Mr. Goode was in fact paid $1,500 for his services by Mr. Watson,
which makes him far from uninterested.

15

The job he was doing for

Mr. Watson was essentially to substantiate cohabitation.
was essentially the purpose for which he was retained.

That
Mr. Goode

is not a true professional such a licensed social worker or
psychologist who might be expected to conduct an independent and
unbiased investigation of, for example, parents' respective
qualifications for custody for the benefit of the court.

He has

one paying client, John Watson, and it a case such as this, he is
expected to find evidence to substantiate cohabitation.
The trial court apparently did not consider the testimony of
Shauna Farnsworth, who stated that she only saw Mr. Talbot in
Camille Watson's house around six times in two years, when she
was visiting her house three to four times per week.

In fact, of

all the witnesses who testified at the evidentiary hearing, only
Mr. Goode testified that he saw Mr. Talbot at Camille Watson's
house every day he conducted surveillance, and that testimony was
shown to be false on cross examination.

In fact, Mr. Talbot did

not conduct personal surveillance every day, and even on days
when he did conduct surveillance, Mr. Talbot was not always
there.

(See citations in Statement of Facts section.)

Among the errors the trial court made in its findings of
fact, which were pointed out in the Statement of Facts section,
supra,

are the following.

The trial court stated that Mr. Hilton

saw Mr. Talbot leave for work from Camille Watson's residence
16

several times between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m.
supported by the record.
T.81

1.6

This is not

Mr. Hilton testified at T.80

1.16

to

that he saw Mr. Talbot leaving Camille Watson's house at

that time once or twice in the last couple of years.

"Once or

twice" is not several, and, as stated earlier, the distinction is
important in this case.

What the actual testimony of Mr. Hilton

showed is that it was very rare indeed for him to see Mr. Talbot
leaving for work from Camille Watson's house, despite the fact
that he had the opportunity to observe her house each morning.
Another serious and material error the trial court committed
in its characterization of Mr. Hilton's testimony is that the
trial court stated that Mr. Hilton expressed his opinion that
Jerry Talbot was living at Camille Watson's home during the
period of December 1994 to November 1995.

Mr. Hilton expressed

no such opinion, and stated only that while Mr. Talbot was
staying at Camille Watson's house for a few days, he appeared to
be living there.

That opinion, even had it been correctly

stated, should have been given little weight, since it is clear
Mr. Hilton was not testifying as to the legal standard for
residency, and his opinion was not very material to the issue of
residency.
It is also significant that Mr. Hilton testified that there
were times when he had not seen Mr. Talbot for periods of weeks.
17

T.90

11.7-9.

There were other errors in the trial court's findings which
were set forth in the Statement of Facts section, and while
individually they were not highly material, the cumulative effect
of them is material because all the other errors were prejudicial
to Camille Watson.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED THE PRINCIPLES OF HADDOW V.
HADDOW
In addition to committing an abuse of discretion in

mischaracterizing the testimony and in its weighing of the
testimony, the trial court also erred in its application of the
facts of this case to the standard set forth in Haddow v. Haddow,
707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985).

The Utah Supreme Court set forth the

test for cohabitation for purposes of terminating alimony and
enforcing an equitable lien in Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669
(Utah 1985) 1 .

The court held there were two key elements to be

considered in determining whether a party is cohabiting: common
residency and sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association.
In applying Haddow, the trial court must determine whether
as a matter of law whether the third party and the ex-spouse have
common residency.

The Utah Supreme Court in Haddow affirmed

definition of "common residency" set forth in Knuteson v.
1

Accord Sigcr v. Sigg, 276 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah Ct. App.,
October 26, 1995) .
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Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1980), which is the sharing of a
common abode that both parties consider their principle domicile
for more than a brief period of time.
citing Knuteson, 619 P.2d at 1389.

Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672,

Haddow also held that the

abode must be "settled," and a stay of two months and ten days
did not qualify as settled.

Id.

The court in Haddow set forth

factors the trial court is to consider in determining whether the
residency requirement has been met.

They are as follows: that

the stay be more than temporary2; that the party and the third
person share common expenses; that the furniture or personal
belongings of the third person be found in the home of the party;
that they share assets or have joint bank accounts or
liabilities; that they jointly own property; that they reside
together continuously for sustained periods of time; that the
third person have free access to the party's residence and may
come and go and he may please, as opposed to the third person
schedule his visits to coincide with the presence of the person
he is visiting.
The trial court in the instant case failed to establish
enough of the factors for it to conclude that the residency
requirement had been meet.

Testimony showed that Mr. Talbot had

2

See Knuteson v. Knuteson. 619 P.2d 1387, 1389(Utah 1980),
where the court held that a stay of two months and ten days did
not establish a "settled abode."
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not moved his furniture, clothing, or any of his personal
belongings into Camille Watson's residence, with the exception of
a television set and a stereo set.

No evidence suggests that Mr.

Talbot stored clothing or other personal effects there.

The

evidence also established that Jerry Talbot and Camille Watson
had no joint credit, and that they had no joint checking
accounts.

In fact, they had not commingled their finances in any

meaningful way.

The trial court points out that Mr. Talbot did

not have a bank account, but that it not material to the issue of
commingling.

The evidence presented at the hearing also

established that Jerry Talbot and Camille Watson have no joint
property of any kind.

The evidence presented at the hearing also

established that Camille Watson has paid from her own proceeds
all living expenses expended on behalf of her or the minor
children issue of these parties, including the payment of the
mortgage, utilities (gas, water, electricity), and food for the
children, with exception of a few times when Mr. Talbot bought
food when he was going to be with Defendant and her children at
her residence.

Furthermore, no evidence was presented that

Camille Watson and Jerry Talbot hold themselves out to the
general public that they reside in the same residence.
The greater weight of the evidence, taking the testimony of
Mr. Hilton, Mrs. Farnsworth, Camille Watson, Mr. Talbot, Rowella
20

Talbot, and other witnesses showed that Camille Watson and Jerry
Talbot have not resided continuously for sustained periods of
time.

The evidence also showed that Camille Watson's residence

was not the primary residence of Jerry Talbot.

Jerry Talbot had

spent the night frequently at Camille Watson's home, but it was
not established that he spent most of his nights there, that he
received most or even a substantial portion of his mail there, or
that he did his laundry there.
The trial court simply did not establish the requisite
elements of residency.

Furthermore, the evidence relating to

sexual contact was very circumstantial.

The trial court seems to

rely heavily on the empty condom box found in the trash by Mr.
Goode.

However, when John Watson's counsel questioned Mr. Talbot

about it, he never asked him if he used the condoms while at
Camille Watson's house.

He only asked him if he had ever used

condoms like the ones which the box apparently had contained, and
Mr. Talbot responded that he did not know.

It should be pointed

out that Camille Watson has a sixteen-year-old son living with
her, and it is possible the box could have belonged to him,
without suggesting that that was the case.
CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion and committed error of
law in applying the test of Haddow v. Haddow (cited
21

infra).

Therefore, the trial court's order terminating John Watson's
alimony obligation and ordering that Camille Watson's residence
be sold pursuant to the terms of the divorce decree should be
overturned.

The appellant, Camille Watson, should be awarded her

costs and attorney fees incurred in defending against John
Watson's order to show cause and incurred in this appeal.
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